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I. INTRODUCTION

Retained Asset Accounts ("RAAs") are a relatively recent innovation of
the life insurance industry. Beginning in about 1984, insurers began
offering beneficiaries, upon claim approval, a draft book with what look
like checks.' Beneficiaries, expecting a check from the insurer and not a
package of blank checks, might review the statement that accompanies the
"check book" and learn that the total amount due under the policy has been
set aside in an RAA.2 The RAA will typically offer a market rate of interest
and may be called any one of several optimistic sounding names: an
Alliance Account, a SecureLine, 4 or a Total Control Account.5 Often the

Professor of Law, Boston University. I am indebted to Jeremy Mason and Michael
Cannella for their excellent research assistance.
1. David Evans, Duping the FamiliesofFallen Soldiers, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2010,
5:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news2010-07-28/duping-the-families-of-fallensoldiers.html.
2. See id.
3. Name used by Prudential Financial, Inc. for its general corporate account where
beneficiaries' funds reside until drawn. Bloomberg News, Death Benefit Accounts Seem to
Slight Survivors, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.corn/2010/07/29/
business/29insure.html.
4. Name used by Lincoln National Life Insurance, Co. for an account established by
the insurer with a third-party where beneficiaries' funds will be deposited at the time and in
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disclosure informs the beneficiary that a check may be written for any
amount from $250.00 up to the full balance.6
To be clear, the beneficiary is essentially given a choice to spend at
least $250.00 or to write a check for the full amount of the policy proceeds.
A choice to write a check for anything less than the full policy amount
results in a balance in the retained asset account. If the beneficiary writes a
check for the full amount to herself, she could then deposit that money into
a traditional bank account.
RAAs have been the subject of considerable recent controversy.
Insurers argue that the RAA provides a valuable service to beneficiaries at
what is often a difficult time in their lives;9 instead of deciding what to do
with a large check, a beneficiary is free to leave their policy proceeds in the
RAA until they are emotionally stable and ready to spend.10 But, in
exchange for this service the beneficiary takes a risk that the insurer may
become insolvent. Numerous commentators have pointed out that not only
do beneficiaries lack individual accounts, they are also exposed to serious
risk of loss in the case of insurer insolvency, which can be easily avoided
by depositing the proceeds in a traditional FDIC-insured bank account."
This Article reviews the recent litigation surrounding these largely
unregulated accounts and evaluates industry claims that RAAs provide a
valuable service for beneficiaries. It argues that the law should demand high
quality disclosure from insurers who offer the RAA option. In Part II, I
describe RAAs and evaluate the industry claim that they are often a good
choice for beneficiaries. In particular, I consider the quality of disclosure to
beneficiaries and the degree to which unused RAA funds are protected in

the amount requested by the beneficiary. Life Insurance Beneficiary's Claimfor Additional
Interest May Proceed;Edmondson v. Lincoln Nat ' Life Ins. Co., No. 10-4919 (E.D. Pa.Apr.
1, 2011), INSURANCE LAW AND LITIGATION WEEK, Apr. 25, 2011, at 26.

5. Name used by MetLife for an account managed by the insurer where
beneficiaries' funds reside until drawn. David Glovin, Forged MetLjfe 'Checks' Show
Retained-Asset Account Risks, BLOOMBERo (Aug. 24, 2010, 11:54 AM), http://www.blo

omberg.com/news/2010-08-24/forged-metlife-check-lawsuit-costs-show-risks-of-retainedasset-account.html.
6. Advocate Law Group P.C., Retained Asset Accounts, http://www.retainedasset
accounts.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
7.
8.

Id.
David Evans, New York Said to Require Payments After Fallen Soldier Story,

(Feb. 23, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/newyork-said-to-require-life-insurer-payments-after-fallen-soldier-report.html.
9. The Beneficiaries of many RAAs are the surviving family members of fallen
soldiers. See id.; Leslie Scism & Erik Holn, Are Life Insurers PlayingFair?,WALL ST. J.,
(Aug. 14, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487037235045754256627
98020930.html.
10. See Evans, supranote 8.
11. See infra notes 156, 173-75 and accompanying text.
BLOOMBERG
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the event of a default or insolvency. Part III reviews the implication for
RAAs of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA)
fiduciary standards. Although authority is split, life insurance offered
through an ERISA plan appears to provide beneficiaries with a higher
degree of protection via ERISA's fiduciary duties than is available to
beneficiaries of non-ERISA plans. In Part IV, I propose uniform, high
quality disclosure to beneficiaries. I conclude that serious concerns about
the absence of FDIC insurance suggest that, at a minimum, insurers need to
provide clear and complete disclosure in order to avoid confusing and
deceiving life insurance beneficiaries.
II. How Do RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS WORK AND WHY ARE THEY
CONTROVERSIAL?

Insurers created the RAA device as a mechanism to increase profits. 12
RAA funds are typically invested in general fund investments, which
often enjoy a rate of return of about 5%. The insurer profits from the spread
between the return on its own investment and the interest paid to the
beneficiary-typically 0.8 to 1.5%. 14 Some RAAs pay a fixed rate of
interest while others use a variable rate. The key feature that drives
profitability, however, is the spread between the investment return rate and
the rate paid to the beneficiary. It is important to note that often the rate the

12. Gerry H. Goldsholle, inventor of RAAs in 1984 while at MetLife, has
acknowledged that he created these financial vehicles so "[t]he company would win because
we would make a nice spread on the money." Evans, Duping the FamiliesofFallen Soldiers,
supranote 1.

13. A recent survey of predominantly insurance company CFOs provides some insight
into both of the investment approaches these companies have taken with the funds in their
general

accounts.

See Towers

Watson,

Insights: Insurer Investment Practices,

(July, 2011),
http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/5008/
TowersWatson-Insurer-Inv-Prac.pdf. The survey's respondents showed that among the
investment vehicles of choice, "[TJaxable fixed-income investments ranked first at 60% with
the full sample and at 77% among life (re)insurers. Tax-exempt municipals (11%) were
followed by cash and high-yield fixed income. Common stock was pegged at 8%, with the
balance spread among real estate, hedge funds and other classes." Id. Moreover, despite the
expected lean towards fixed-income investments, nearly half of respondents indicated that
they would pursue more aggressive investment strategies in the near future. Id.; see also
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, 2011 LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 11-12 (2011),
available at http://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact2OBook
/Documents/2011 %20Fact%2OBook.pdf (discussing how divergent investment strategies
between life insurance general accounts and separate accounts is manifest across the
industry, with nearly 72% of general account funds invested in bonds versus an 80%
investment in stocks for separate accounts).
14. Leslie Scism, Insurers Safe If Accounts End, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703791804575439833429948208.html.
TOWERSwATSON.COM
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beneficiary receives is higher than the prevailing bank savings rate or
money market rate. Because many beneficiaries do not withdraw all of their
funds promptly, insurers are currently estimated to be holding at least $28
billion in RAA dollars that would otherwise have been paid out upon claim
verification."s
As one might expect, the level of profits associated with RAAs is in
dispute. However, best estimates put the profits at 0.3% to 1.8% of earnings
at the largest insurers.16 Thus, while generating positive cash flow, RAAs
cannot be described as a significant source of profit for the insurance
industry. Numerous insurers have pointed out that few beneficiaries would
be able to match the returns on investment generated by the insurers'
professional investment managers.' 7 This is why, they argue, the RAAs
represent a genuine service to beneficiaries: a grieving survivor can leave
her policy proceeds to be invested by a professional for as long as she
wishes and at no cost. And, when she is ready to spend, all she has to do is
write a check. The interest bearing account, the argument goes, increases
the odds that unsophisticated and distraught survivors will avoid greedy and
grasping relatives and others eager to take advantage.
Following their introduction in 1984,18 RAAs quickly gained
popularity. The recent critical attention can be traced to an influential article
in Bloomberg News that focused on the case of the survivors of a soldier
killed in the conflict in Afghanistan.19 In that case, Ms. Lohman, mother of
the deceased soldier, received a large envelope from Prudential Financial,

15. Bloomberg News, Death Benefit Accounts Seem to Slight Survivors, N.Y TIMES,
July 29,2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/business/29insure.html.
16. Scism, supranote 14.
17. Scism & Holm, supra note 9 ("Short-term interest rates are now close to zero, so
many money-market funds are paying less than insurers are."); Hugh Son, PrudentialSays
Retained Accounts Helpful To Beneficiaries, Have Insurance,BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-12/prudential-calls-retained-accounts-helpful-tobeneficiaries-fully-insured.html ("Prudential Financial Inc., the second-largest U.S. life
insurer, said the 'vast majority' of survivors getting so-called retained-asset accounts benefit
from the service."); Bloomberg News, supra note 3 ('"For some families, the account is the
difference between earning interest on a large amount of money and letting it sit idle' . . . .").
18. It appears MetLife pioneered the product in 1984, see Evans, supra note 1, and
Prudential Financial started using retained-asset accounts for beneficiaries represented by the
Department of Veterans Affairs in 1999. Bloomberg News, V.A. Agreed to Withholding of
Benefits, Documents Say, N.Y. TIMEs (Sep. 29, 2010), http://nytimes.com/2010/09/14
/business/14insure.html. Notably, MassMutual, Aflac, and Hartford Financial Services
Group still automatically send beneficiaries a bank check for the full policy amount. Alexis
Leondis, MassMutual Skips Retained Accounts, Cuts Beneficiaries a Check, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-06/massmutual-skipsretained-accounts-cuts-beneficiaries-a-check.html.
19. Evans, supra note 1.
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Inc., the carrier chosen by the Department of Veterans Affairs. 20 The
envelope contained what appeared to be a checkbook and a letter regarding
her son's $400,000 policy. 1 The letter explained that the policy amount due
would be placed in "a convenient interest-bearing account" until she
decided when and how much to withdraw.22 A fine print disclaimer on the
letter revealed that the account holding the funds was not guaranteed by the
FDIC; Ms. Lohman said she did not notice it.23 Six months passed before
she attempted to access any of the funds in the account via the checkbook
provided by Prudential. 24 When using a check to make two purchases, one
for a bed and the other for a camera, each time the salesperson rejected it.25
Despite appearing to be checks tied to a bank account-the bank name of
JPMorgan Chase, not Prudential, appeared on each of the checks--these
were in fact drafts which meant that funds were only available for access
through JPMorgan Chase after Prudential sent the amount requested.26
Prudential responded to inquiries from New Jersey insurance regulators
about Ms. Lohman's case and RAAs in general.27 A letter received by New
Jersey's Commissioner of banking and insurance revealed that from
October 2008 through April 2010, twenty-five other drafts had cleared Ms.
Lohman's RAA account, with most of the benefits withdrawn by the end of
that time period.28 However, Ms. Lohman was quick to note those cleared
drafts were not always processed "in a timely fashion" and more slowly
than what would be expected for checks written on a bank account.29
The Bloomberg piece generated enormous media interest, which
prompted investigations and promises of legislative action from a variety of

20. Bloomberg News, supranote 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Glovin, supranote 5.
28. Id.
29. Leslie Scism & Erik Holm, State Blesses Payouts By Pru, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703435104575421820804791574.
html.
30. See, e.g., Scism & Holm, supra note 9. ("The checkbook approach has been
around since the 1980s. But a July Bloomberg Markets magazine article put a human face on
the subject."); Eleanore Szymanski, Insurance Companies Benefit Greatly from Retained
Asset Accounts, TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2011, at D04; David Evans, US. Pays as PrudentialInvests
Troop Death Benefits, WASH. PosT, Oct. 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/02/AR2010100200530.html; Dan Frosch, Families of Dead
Soldiers Sue Insurer Over Its Handling of Survivors' Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/us/30prudential.html.
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sources. The Attorney General of New York, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 32 and the FDIC33 each expressed
concern about the unregulated nature of these large bank-like "accounts."
Plaintiffs' lawyers quickly joined the fray and filed class actions against
major insurers holding RAA dollars.3
Quickly, a few key issues crystallized. First, and perhaps most
importantly, was an insurer bound by ERISA fiduciary standards at the
31. Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General
Cuomo Launches Investigation Of Life Insurance Industry For Defrauding Military Families
And Others Of Millions In Cash Payouts (July 29, 2010), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-launches-investigation-lifeinsurance-industry-defrauding.
32. Consumer Alert, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Retained
Asset Accounts and Life Insurance: What Consumers Need to Know About Life Insurance
Benefit Payment Options (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/
consumeralertraa.htm; Press Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
NAIC President Jane L. Cline Releases Statement Regarding Retained Asset Accounts (July
29, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/raa-statement.htm.
33. Letter from Sheila C. Blair, Chairman, FDIC, to Therese M. Vaughan, Ph. D,
CEO, NAIC (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file with author).
34. See, e.g., David Glovin, MetLife Must Defend Lawsuit Over Retained Asset
Checkbook, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1220/metlife-must-defend-lawsuit-over-checks-forged-from-retained-asset-account.html
("MetLife wouldn't make payments to Herrera, the beneficiary of Diaz's policy, after the
daughter allegedly forged Herrera's name to $302,820 in checks, according to the
complaint."); Bloomberg News, Suit: PrudentialMade S500M Off Vets' Death-Benefit
Money, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20100831/FREE/100839981 ("The suit claims Prudential fails to pay beneficiaries in a lump
sum as required by U.S. law and the language of the policies, instead encouraging them to
leave the money in accounts with the company, which pays them a small amount of
interest.").
35. ERISA section 3(21)(A) provides that, except in the case of an investment
company described in section 3(21)(B), a person is a plan fiduciary "to the extent" he (i)
exercises discretionary authority or control over plan management or any authority or
control over management or disposition of plan assets, (ii) renders investment advice
regarding plan assets for a fee or other compensation or has authority or responsibility to do
so, or (iii) has any discretionary authority or responsibility in plan administration. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21XA)-(B) (2011). Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA imposes a basic duty on plan
fiduciaries to act "solely in the interest" of plan participants and beneficiaries otherwise
known as the exclusive benefit rule. Subsection (A) of this section adds the requirement that
the fiduciary act for the "exclusive purpose" of providing plan benefits and defraying
reasonable expenses of plan administration. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2011). Section
404(a)(1)(B) requires a plan fiduciary to act with the "care, skill, prudence and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2011). Section 404(a)(1)(C) requires a fiduciary
to "diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless
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time the RAA was created or were all duties discharged when policy assets
were deposited into the RAA? This would become a crucial question
because ERISA fiduciary liability is often expansive-if an insurer's
fiduciar duties continue after the formation of the RAA, liability may
attach. Second, was the nature and quality of disclosure that beneficiaries
received adequate? (Were beneficiaries improperly led to believe that their
RAA dollars were insured against institutional failure? In the event of
insolvency," would a beneficiary's funds be subject to the general claims

under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aX1)(C) (2011).
Section 404(aXl)(D) requires a fiduciary to act "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this subehapter and subchapter III of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(D) (2011). Section 404(c) protects the fiduciary from liability when a loss or
breach occurs as a result of a participant's exercise of control over the assets in the account.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2011). Section 406(b)(1) prohibits a fiduciary from dealing with plan
assets in his own interest or for his own account, otherwise known as the prohibition against
self-dealing. 29 U.S.C. §1106 (bXl) (2011).
36. The liability for a fiduciary in breach can be substantial. ERISA §409(a) imposes
liability on the fiduciary in breach to: (1) make restitution of plan losses caused by the
breach, (2) disgorge profits obtained as a result of the breach, and (3) be subject to other
equitable relief deemed appropriate by the court to address harm caused by the breach. See
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2011). There are two distinct causes of action available in the event
that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3) (2011). The first,
under section 502(a)(2), is available to the Secretary of Labor, a plan participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary in order to obtain relief for the benefit plan only, as opposed to
individual plan participants. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(10-(2); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (finding that suit under § 502(a)(2) may be brought only on
behalf of the benefit plan as a whole). Section 502(a)(3), alternatively, permits a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary to enjoin any act or practice that violates either Title I of ERISA or
the language of the insurance contract, or to obtain equitable relief for such a violation; this
equitable relief has been held to permit individual relief. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Vanty
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (finding individualized equitable relief under section
502(a)(3) proper "for injuries caused by violations that section 502 does not elsewhere
adequately remedy"). Moreover, litigation initiated by the Secretary of Labor can trigger
civil penalties against the fiduciary in breach in addition to the liability created by the
breach. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 32(iXl) (2011). Those under section 502(i) apply to prohibited
transactions and the penalty can range from as low as 5%to 100% of the amount involved in
the transaction. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) (2011). Section 502(1) imposes a 20% penalty on
amounts recovered for a benefit plan by judgment or settlement. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1)
(2011).
37. State insurance commissioners "can order conservation, rehabilitation or
liquidation on numerous statutory grounds ranging from financial insolvency to unsuitable
management and operations." Kris DeFrain, US. InsuranceFinancialRegulatory Oversight
and the Role of Capital Requirements, Ctr. for Ins. Policy and Research Newsletter (in
conjunction with the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs), Jan. 2012, available at
http://www.naic.org/ciprnewsletterarchive/vol2_oversight.htm. Bankruptcy is governed
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of creditors or would they be protected by state guaranty funds?" Did the
insurer's communications create a reasonable impression in the beneficiary
that her money would be retained in a bank-like account?) Third and
finally, in the non-ERISA context, is there a fiduciary relationship between
an insured and the insurer that is breached by the normal operation of an
RAA?
Although recent and still developing, there is now enough case law to
allow for a preliminary answer to each of these questions and to help guide
insurers that wish to continue to offer RAAs. As one would expect, the
ERISA/non-ERISA dividing line is significant, with ERISA fiduciary
standards offering more robust protection to beneficiaries than non-ERISA
state contract law. Additionally, it is clear that the quality of disclosures
made to beneficiaries is critical. As with so many other areas of insurance

by federal regulations whereas insolvency is managed under diverse state receivership laws.
See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11 (West 2012); N.Y. INs. LAW § 7419 (Mckinney 2005); TEx.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 443 (West 2009). Bankruptcy is a process by which the court

administers the estate of the debtor to allow, disallow, organize, and prioritize claims
amongst creditors with claims to the debtor's estate. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 6 (2012).
The two primary aims of these bankruptcy proceedings are to (1) convert the debtor's estate
into funds to distribute to its creditors and (2) grant the debtor relief to the extent possible
from overwhelming indebtedness. 9 Am. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy § 5 (2012). Insolvency is
similar yet distinct from bankruptcy in that the standard is whether the insurer is in a
hazardous financial condition, which is usually found when its assets are exceeded by claims
or other liabilities or if the insurer is unable to pay its obligations when due. See 1 COUCH ON
INs. § 5:6 (2011). Secured creditors, those who have a lien on property, are better situated
compared to unsecured creditors who lack any interest in specific property of the debtor.
Whether through insolvency dissolution or bankruptcy, the benefit of the lien to secured
creditors is that the court will generally honor the lien, resulting in proportionally larger
repayment of the debt owed than would otherwise occur. The unsecured creditor, however,
simply has an interest in some amount owed and therefore must compete with other
unsecured creditors for a portion of the liquidated assets, which can result in a repayment
that is proportionally small relative to the obligation owed. See I COUCH ON INS. § 6:8
(2011) and C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 983 (2012).
38. State guarantee funds operate in a similar fashion to the more commonly known
FDIC guarantee, but the consuming public knows little of their existence or operation. While
the FDIC provides a $250,000 guarantee per account, state guaranty funds designate a single
umbrella guarantee for all policies held by an insurer, which is typically set at $300,000.
States also have placed guaranty limits on particular types of insurance where the life
insurance guaranty often equals the total aggregate guaranty. Those entitled to a death
benefit under an RAA and entitled to the benefits of other policies held by a now insolvent
insurer will have to leave benefits on the table that would otherwise be due. What Happens
When Your Insurance Company Becomes Insolvent, INSURE.COM (Oct. 2, 2009),

http://www.insure.com/articles/generalinsurance/bankrupt-company.html. Even if the funds
owed to the beneficiary are well within the amount of the state guaranty, immediate access
to those accounts held by the insurer may be delayed by administrative rules or worsefrozen by court order. Glovin, supranote 5.
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law, the clarity of information provided and the reasonable expectations"
of the intended beneficiary of the policy dominate when considering the
reasonableness of an RAA.

39. See, e.g., Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Iowa
1995) (finding that the insurer did nothing that would have led plaintiff to think coverage
would have been extended where the policy contained an exclusion for "intoxication" and
the deceased had consumed alcohol for ten hours prior to death by carbon monoxide
asphyxiation); Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283-84 (Ariz. 1987)
(stating that unambiguous boilerplate terms will not be enforced in circumstances where the
terms "cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer," where "fill and
adequate notice of the term" is lacking and the provision is "unusual or unexpected, or ...
emasculates apparent coverage," where actions by the insurer "create an objective
impression of coverage in the mind of the reasonable insured," or where "the insurer has
induced a particular insured [to] reasonably. . . believe that he has coverage. . . [when]

coverage is expressly . . . denied by the policy").
40. The doctrine of reasonable expectations draws inspiration from the contracts
doctrine of adhesion in that it exists to counterbalance the disproportionate expertise and
comprehension of policy terms enjoyed by the insurance company relative to the insured.
Application of reasonable expectations of the insured results in the court considering "what a
hypothetical reasonable insured would glean from the wording of the particular policy and
the kind of insurance at issue" in order to evaluate whether the insured's interpretation of the
policy would stand against the insurer's interpretation. See 16 RIcHARD A. LORD, WILLiSTON
oN CoNTRAcTs § 49:20 (4th ed. 2000). Courts have diverged on whether or not an ambiguity
of the policy language is a prerequisite for applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
Some conclude "even an unambiguous contract has been interpreted contrary to its plain
meaning so as to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured." Gibson v. Callaghan,
730 A.2d 1278, 1283 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 548
A.2d 188, 191 (N.J. 1988 )); see also Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l. Mut. Ins. Co., 366
N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (finding that although definition of terms in the burglary clause
had unambiguous meanings, consideration of the reasonable expectations of the insured was
in keeping with the intent of the clause as a whole). Others find that an absence of ambiguity
will present no obstacle if "it is proved that the parties' prior dealings led the insured to form
a reasonable belief" Allen v. Sentry Ins., 630 A.2d 780, 781 (N.H 1993) (quoting V & V
Corp. v. Am. Policyholders' Ins. Co., 500 A.2d 695, 700 (N.H. 1985)). Yet some have held a
more rigid line that "the doctrine of reasonable expectations is applicable . . . only if the
terms thereof are ambiguous or conflicting, or if the policy contains a hidden trap or pitfall,
or if the fine print purports to take away what is written in large print." Hallowell v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982); see also Boggs v. Camden-Clark
Mem'1 Hosp. Corp., 693 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 2010) (noting that the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is reserved for when the policy language is ambiguous); Colony Ins. Co. v.
Dover Indoor Climbing Gym, 974 A.2d 399 (N.H. 2009) (noting that without ambiguity the
court should not consider the parties' reasonable expectations).
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III. ERISA FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DISCLOSURE
A. ERISA Life InsurancePlans
1. The Exclusive Benefit Rule
The First and Second Circuits, which are the only federal appellate
courts to have ruled on RAAs thus far, have split on the question of the
scope of ERISA fiduciary duty and the formation of an RAA. In Faber v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.4 1 and Mogel v. Unum Life Insurance Co.
ofAmerica,4 2 the courts were presented with similar facts but came to very
different conclusions about the reach of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. In
Mogel the plaintiffs were a class of beneficiaries of UNUM's RAAs who
alleged "breaches of fiduciary duties under . . . ERISA."A Plaintiffs

submitted valid death benefit claims to UNUM." UNUM then mailed each
plaintiff both a letter and a checkbook.4 s The letter told the recipients: (1)
that the death benefits were now in a 'UNUM Security Account,' (2) that
these accounts would garner interest at a variable rate, and (3) that the
checks in the checkbook could be used to draw on the account amounts of
at least $250 and up to the balance of the account.46
The court quickly dismissed UNUM's initial defense when it observed
that "delivery of the checkbook did not constitute a 'lump sum payment'
called for by the policies."47 The key issue then became whether UNUM
continued to act as an ERISA fiduciary even after the RAAs were
established. Relying on language in the policy that noted that "'all benefits
payable ... will be paid as soon as the Insurance Company receives proof
of claim acceptable to it' and '[u]nless otherwise elected, payment for loss
of life will be made in one lump sum," the Mogel court reasoned that
"until the beneficiaries received the lump sum payment to which they were
entitled, UNUM remained obligated to carry out its fiduciary duty under the
plan."49 Since Mogel, several decisions of the Massachusetts District Court
have followed and reiterated this rationale.50

41. 648 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011).
42. 547 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2008).
43. Id. at 24.
44. Id. at 25
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 26.
50. See, e.g., Luitgaren v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Can., No. 1:09-CV-1 1410, 2010 WL
4722269, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2010) (noting that "until a lump sum check is cashed by
the beneficiary, 'the money due to the beneficiary is an asset of the plan' (quoting Mogel v.
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Mogel has proven influential well beyond the First Circuit and in nonERISA cases. For example, in Keife v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,5
the Nevada District Court found that "under the plain language of Section 5
[of the policy], MetLife was obligated to pay Keife the death benefits (1)
immediately, and (2) in one sum, after receiving a completed claims
form." 52 The defendant-insurer asserted that the RAA in question was the
equivalent of a complete lump sum payment.s3 The court rejected this
argument, noting that "MetLife did not make an immediate payment of the
benefits because MetLife maintained possession and control of the funds
while they were in the [RAA]." 54

UNUM Life. Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2008))). The court refused to adopt
an "all's well that ends well approach [that] ignores the purpose of ERISA's imposition of
fiduciary duties." In Otte ex rel. Estate of Reynolds v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 275 F.RD.
50 (D. Mass. 2011), the court noted that it was "persuaded by the First Circuit's reasoning in
Mogel that the checkbook at issue was 'no more than an IOU which did not transfer the
funds to which the beneficiaries were entitled out of the plan assets[;] hence [the defendant
insurer] remained a fiduciary with respect to those funds."' Id. at 55 (quoting Mogel, 547
F.3d at 27); see also Lucey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 F. Supp. 2d 207, 209-12 (D.
Mass. 2011), which considered two federally subsidized life insurance programs covering
veterans and service members. The policy language in Lucey provided that "[t]he member
may elect settlement of insurance under this subchapter either in a lump sum or in thirty-six
equal monthly installments." Id. at 209. Most beneficiaries opted for the lump sum and the
court, relying explicitly on Mogel, noted that "[t]he difference between delivery of a check
and a checkbook . .. is the difference between [the insurance company] retaining or [the
insurance company] divesting possession of Plaintiffs' funds." Id. at 212.
51. 797 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Nev. 2011).
52. Id. at 1077.
53. Id.
54. The Keife court was emphatic:
The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and
finds that Keife has sufficiently alleged that MetLife breached its obligations to
pay the death benefits immediately, and in one sum. Although MetLife argues that
it paid Keife's death benefits immediately upon receipt of his completed claims
form by crediting the full amount of the benefits to a TCA and sending him a
checkbook to draw upon the TCA, the court finds that MetLife did not make an
immediate payment of the benefits because MetLife maintained possession and
control of the funds while they were in the TCA. Until Keife draws on the account,
the funds represented by the checkbook are not in Keife's possession. Rather, they
are maintained in MetLife's general operating account and MetLife has the use of
those funds for its own benefit. Therefore, the court finds that crediting a TCA
does not constitute immediate payment of the death benefits and, as such, Keife
has sufficiently alleged that MetLife breached the FEGLI Policy."
Id.
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Perhaps the most helpful discussion of ERISA duties in the context of
RAAs is found in Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'1 Life Insurance Co., 55 where
the Pennsylvania District Court offered a detailed rationale for the Mogel
court's assertion that ERISA, and in particular the Supreme Court's Harris
Trust?6 decision, requires broad construction of the term "fiduciary."57 As
Edmonson points out, there are two possible bases in ERISA for a claim of
ongoing fiduciary duty after the establishment of an RAA: first, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a),ss which requires a fiduciary to act solely in the interest of plan
participants and beneficiaries for the purpose of providing benefits (this is

55. 777 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
56. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86
(1993). Harris Trust involved the trustee of a retirement plan who brought suit against John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., alleging-among other claims-violations of ERISA in
the management of the group annuity funds. Id. at 93-94. The court held that this financial
vehicle did not fall under ERISA's guaranteed benefit exclusion because funds in excess of
those necessary to fulfill guaranteed benefits were still subject to the discretionary
management of the insurer; thus, the insurer had fiduciary obligations in the management of
those excess funds. Id. at 101-07. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion emphasized that "[t]o
help fulfill ERISA's broadly protective purposes, Congress commodiously imposed
fiduciary standards on persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits retirement plan
participants will receive." Id. at 96 (footnote omitted). The consequence of such a broad
approach to finding when fiduciary duties apply is a proportional narrowing of the
guaranteed benefit policy exception. See id. at 97. This interpretation embraces the
functional approach embodied in the language of the statute itself, which defines a fiduciary
as any person who "exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of [plan] assets." See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2011) (emphasis added).
57. See Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. at 883-93.
58. See e.g., Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that,
where plaintiffs alleged that defendant trustees and their legal counsel waived interest on
delinquent contributions to the health and pension funds, ERISA plan trustees have a
fiduciary duty to act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled for use on
behalf of beneficiaries and participants); Martin v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 828 F. Supp. 1427,
1436 (D. Alaska 1992) (holding that the exclusive benefit rule of ERISA was violated
"[w]hen NBA [using plan assets to make mortgage loans to mortgagors who used mortgage
loan proceeds to retire construction loans made by a bank].. . was acting in its own interest,
assuring itself that the construction loan would be virtually without risk"); Williams v.
Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (S.D. Ala.1991) (holding that ERISA
fiduciaries should exercise discretion to serve the interests of all plan participants and that an
employer would be liable for breach of that duty if it knowingly and deliberately withheld
information about modification of the plan's vesting requirements from employees); Foltz v.
U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that, where
plaintiff's stock in employer was valued using the minority-as opposed to the majorityvaluation prior to sale of employer, the exclusive benefit rule creates no exclusive duty of
maximizing benefits).
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known as the exclusive benefit rule); and second, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1), 59
which prohibits fiduciaries from self-dealing.60
The exclusive benefit rule creates a fundamental duty in an ERISA
fiduciary to act "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries."61 This provision embodies both a
fundamental principle of what it means to operate in a fiduciary capacity62
as well as the purpose of the ERISA statute as a whole to ensure that the
benefits promised to employees are safeguarded from employer
malfeasance. The prohibition against self-dealing is a particular type of
prohibited transaction that was designed to protect the plan assets from
being abused by the fiduciary to its own benefit at the expenses of the
beneficiaries. This provision accounts for what is one of several

59. See, e.g., Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an
ERISA fiduciary violated prohibition on self-dealing where the fiduciary failed to meet its
"burden of proving that he fulfilled his duties of care and loyalty and that the ESOP received
adequate consideration," the valuation provided by third-party was not questioned, and a
casual review would have revealed it was careless in its assessment); Acosta v. Pacific
Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1991), amended after reh'g (holding that plan
fiduciaries' use of shareholdings list in connection with the election of the board of
directors-allegedly to solicit votes-was not a valid self-dealing claim because it failed to
"demonstrate that [the defendant] actually used its power to deal with the assets of the plan
for its own benefit") (emphasis added); Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 653 F. Supp.
1542, 1554 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the investment manager, investment banking
corporation, and registered broker dealer-along with officers and shareholders-violated
the prohibition on self-dealing in "readily apparent" fashion where they caused pension plan
assets to be invested in companies in which officers and directors had equity interest and
where the investment manager agreed to provide consulting services to a corporation at the
same time it had agreed to invest the plan assets in that same corporation); Alves v. Harvard
Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 198, 216 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that ERISA
health plan sponsors did not engage in self-dealing where beneficiaries' copayments
exceeded sponsor's actual costs for the same prescription drugs through use of discounting
arrangements and where no evidence was produced that sponsors sought to gain, "even
indirectly," from the copayment provision); LaScala v. Scrufari, 96 F. Supp. 2d 233, 237
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the ERISA plan manager who allegedly gave himself pay
raise without authorization by plan trustees was not exempted from claims of self-dealing
under sections 408(b)(2) and 408(cX2) because "there [would] be no triable issue of fact
regarding the reasonableness of [the pay raise if it was proved that the plan manager]
violated the prohibitions against self-dealing").
60. See Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 883-84.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(IXA)(i) (2011).
62. "To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty ... concerning coverage under
any employee benefit plan, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was acting in a fiduciary
capacity when it made the challenged representations." Stark v. Mars, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d
658, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
63. 29U.S.C.§ 1106(b)(1)(2011).
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prohibited transactions that are crucial to defining the obligations, negative
as well as affirmative, of an ERISA fiduciary."
In the Mogel line of cases, the courts had to address the defendantinsurer claim that the guaranteed-benefit exemption precluded a finding of
ongoing fiduciary status. ERISA goes to great lengths to carve out
exceptions to "plan assets" that warrant fiduciary obligations. 5 The court in
Trs. of Laborers' Local No. 72 Pension Fund v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Co." acknowledged that the exception exists to limit the scope of fiduciary
obligation for insurers when operating general corporate accounts that are
used to fund not only benefits to policy holders but to meet the insurer's
operating expenses. When grappling with a circuit splite over the reach of
this exception, the Supreme Court in Harris Trust acknowledged that
Congress did not intend to have all general account funds exempted from
fiduciary liability.69 The Supreme Court adopted the Peoria Union"o
approach where "division of the contract into its component parts and
examination of risk allocation in each component" form the basis for
determining when funds fall into or outside the exception. 7 1
This line of cases, which relies on Mogel and rests post-RAA fiduciary
liability on the retention of funds by the insurer, is not without its critics.
The Second Circuit carved out a different path in Faber,which has become
the basis for a distinct line of cases that rejects the who-holds-the-money
approach adopted in Mogel." The Faber court relied squarely on an

64. See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (a) (2011) (prohibiting a fiduciary to engage in a
transaction with a party they "[knew] or should [have] know[n]" was a party in interest).
65. Section I 101(b)(2) provides that when "a guaranteed benefit policy is issued by an
insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall not, solely
by reason of the issuance of such policy, be deemed to include any assets of such insurer."
29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (2011). This guaranteed benefit policy is further clarified as "an
insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or contract provides for benefits
the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes any surplus in a
separate account, but excludes any other portion of a separate account." 29 U.S.C §
1101(b)(2)(B) (2011).
66. 783 F. Supp. 899 (D.N.J. 1992).
67. Id. at 904 n.7.
68. Compare Mack Boring & Parts Co. v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial
Consultants of N.J., 930 F.2d 267, 277 (3d Cir.1991) (holding that fiduciary duties do not
apply to finds deposited in the general account for a policy with guaranteed benefits), with
Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Ret. Plan v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 327 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding a phasic analysis of the insurance contract as necessary to observe when
fiduciary duties applied).
69. HarrisTrust, 510 U.S. at 100-01 n.12.
70. PeoriaUnion Stock Yards Co. Ret. Plan,698 F.2d at 324-27.
71. HarrisTrust, 510 U.S. at 102.
72. See, e.g., Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2011).
73. See id.
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opinion of the Department of Labor ("DOL"), which took the position that
an RAA was an effective distribution of assets that extinguished the
defendant-insurer's fiduciary duties under ERISA.7 4 The Second Circuit
suggested the DOL's view was entitled to deference and distinguished the
policy at issue in Mogel, which expressly called for a lump sum payment,
from the plan language of the policy in Faber providing for an RAA." The
Fabercourt noted that the creation of the RAA transformed the relationship
between the insurance company and the beneficiary from one of fiduciary
(governed by ERISA) to that of debtor and account holder.76 The Faber
court focused on an important feature of RAAs: Given that a beneficiary
can take all of her benefits from the RAA at any time and "ERISA does no
more than protect the benefits which are due to an employee under a
plan,"" what exactly is the duty breached by the creation of the RAA?
ERISA fiduciary duty case law is familiar with situations in which an
arrangement that provides a benefit to the plan is challenged as a violation
of the exclusive benefit rule. Lockheed Co. v. Spink78 and Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Jacobson79 concerned whether amendments made by employers to
benefit plans amounted to conduct on the part of the employer that
constituted an exercise of fiduciary duty that would have violated the
exclusive benefit rule.80 In both Hughes and Spink, the Supreme Court went
to great lengths to point out that the alleged benefits retained by the
employers8 ' did not arise out of any commercial transactions with plan
assets or employee benefits.8 2 This meant that fiduciary obligations,
including the exclusive benefit rule, were not triggered. Applying this
reasoning to the use of RAAs, the real issue is whether the plan derives an
incidental benefit from the creation of the RAA or whether it has stepped

74. See id. at 105-06.
75. See id. at 106-07.
76. See id. at 106.
77. Id. at 107 (quoting Bennett v. Conrail Matched Say. Plan Admin. Comm., 168
F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
79. 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
80. See id. at444;Spink 517 U.S. at 891.
81. See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 437 (holding that employer use of surplus funds from
employee contribution plan to fuid new non-contribution plan with lesser benefits and fewer
costs to the employer was not an impermissible incidental benefit ); Spink, 517 U.S. at 888
(holding that conditioning waiver of employment-related claims prior to receiving early
retirement benefits is an amendment to the terms of the plan and not a transaction and
therefore escapes fiduciary review).
82. See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 444; Spink, 517 U.S. at 891-93 (noting that the fiduciary
duty is triggered in the management of the plan assets); see also Siskind v. Sperry Ret.
Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995); Lynch v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 758 F.
Supp. 976, 997 (D.N.J. 1991).
83. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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over the line and engaged in a practice designed to extract a benefit at the
expense of participants and beneficiaries. 4
2. Self-Dealing
The ERISA prohibition against self-dealing forbids a fiduciary from
using plan assets for their own benefit.' 5 The clearest case for a violation is
where there is both a net benefit to the fiduciary and a net loss to the plan.
Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni and Board of Trustees of the Airconditioning
and Refrigeration Industry Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. J.R.D
Medical Services, Inc. provide (unfortunately common) examples of
behavior the statue prohibits.'
In Sahni the manager of the company health plan engaged in what the
court generously described as "sloppy" accounting practices. 7' The account
manager had sole control over both the account into which premiums were
deposited and the one from which he drafted payments for claims.
Ultimately the manager commingled the funds in both of those accounts
and what he described as his "administrative fee" into the claims account
from which he wrote payments to medical providers. 9 Sahni continued to
pay himself the administrative fee for an additional three months after his
termination."0 He also received a commission for selecting the insurer of
claims in excess of $500 for the health benefits plan.9 1 The court was

84. See, e.g., Wright v. Nimmons, 641 F. Supp. 1391, 1402-03 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
("Defendant ... blatantly disregarded his duty of loyalty by consistently treating the trust
assets as if they were his own property[,]" which was evidenced most clearly in his transfer
of plan assets to finance corporate purchases); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390,
409-10 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (finding that breach of fiduciary duty occurred where defendant
trustees credited themselves time worked and used plan funds to meet their monthly
contributions in order to obtain access to plan benefits to the detriment of other plan
participants).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (b)(i) (2011).
86. See Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
a fiduciary engaged in self-dealing where he set his own compensation and collected the
amount from plan assets); Bd. of Trs. of the Airconditioning & Refrigeration Indus. Health
& Welfare Fund v. J.R.D. Mech. Servs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that fiduciary engaged in an act of self-dealing when it paid creditors instead of
making required contribution to plan); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Morin, No.
Civ. 99-246-P-C, 2000 WL 760737, at *5 (D. Me. Apr. 24, 2000) (holding that trustee
committed two acts of self-dealing where he transferred $141,760 of plan assets to himself
and an additional $1,200 to a corporation he controlled).
87. Sahni, 262 F.3d at 901.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 902.
91. Id.
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unequivocal in concluding that these were "per se breach[es] of fiduciary
duty in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106T)," given that the plan manager,
Sahni, was acting in a fiduciary capacity.
While Sahni involved a fiduciary engaged in self-dealing through acts
of direct and indirect compensation, J.R.D. Medical Services, Inc.93
illustrates how the use of plan assets to satisfy a fiduciary's pre-existing
financial obligations is also an act of self-dealing. Here the corporate officer
tasked with managing plan assets subordinated the obligation to make
contributions to the plan to the demands of creditors. 4 The court noted that
"a fiduciary [who] uses plan assets to satisfy other business obligations ...
violates this duty." 95 Read together with Sahni, these cases demonstrate that
self-dealing is evident where measurable harm to the plan assets
accompanies the identified benefit to the fiduciary. In the RAA life
insurance context, the self-dealing claim is that the insurer-fiduciary retains
assets properly belonging to the beneficiary in order to generate a profit for
itself at the expense of the participant-beneficiary.
B. Non-ERISA Plans
The non-ERISA landscape is friendliest to insurers when plan
documents explicitly permit payment through a retained asset account.
Insurers generally owe no fiduciary duty to insureds,9 which means that
language in the insurance contract will be enforced absent some

92. Id. at 904.
93. J.R.D. Mech. Servs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
94. Id.atl118.
95. Id. at 1123 (quoting PMTA-ILA Containerization Fund v. Rose, No. 94-5635,
1995 WL 461269, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. At common law there is no fiduciary duty owed to the insured as long as the
insurance company remains able to act in its own interests and that the insurer's obligation
to act in good faith provides sufficient protection. 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS
AND DISPUTES § 9:28 (5th ed. 2012). This approach is applied generally, with some
jurisdictions heightening the good faith obligation owed. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Life Ins.
Co. of Va. 177 F.3d 507, 521 (6th Cir. 1999) (insurer not a fiduciary); Vill. Northridge
Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 237 P.3d 598, 608 (Cal. 2010) (quoting
Morris v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)) ('"[Ain
insurer is not a fiduciary, and owes no obligation to consider the interests of its insured
above its own."'); Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 735 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) ("[A]n insurer's breach of its fiduciary-like duties is adequately redressed by a claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the insurance contract.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 503
(Wash. 1992) (no fiduciary relationship). But see Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo.,
Inc., 931 P.2d 436, 443 (Colo. 1997) (duty to deal in good faith creates "quasi-fiduciary"
relationship); Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 979 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ne. 1999) (duty
owed is fiduciary in nature).
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extraordinary circumstance that is inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations97 of the insured or evidence of behavior that violates public
policy. 98 As the small handful of non-ERISA cases makes clear, the99 RAA
remains a legal vehicle for payment of life insurance proceeds. The
Massachusetts District Court had an opportunity to consider the effect of
Mogel on non-ERISA plans in Lucey v. Prudential Insurance Co. of
America.1 Recall that in Luitgaren'o and Ottelo2 (both cases involving

97. "[Tlhe rule of construction now known as the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
whereby the court upholds the insured's expectations as to the scope of coverage, provided
that the expectations are objectively reasonable." 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 22:11 (2011).
Absent an ambiguity in the policy, many jurisdictions require evidence of extraordinary
circumstances before applying the doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Res. Ins. Co. v. H & H Stephens
Const., Inc., 939 So. 2d 868, 880 (Ala. 2006) ("[The doctrine of reasonable expectations is
not so expansive that any ambiguity in a policy will automatically justify disregarding an
unambiguous exclusion in the policy.") (emphasis added); West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 776 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Minn. 2009) ("In the absence of ambiguity in the
policy language or an 'extreme situation' . . . the language of an insurance policy 'must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning.' (citation omitted) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 2006))). For a discussion of
jurisdictions that adopt more expansive approaches, see supra notes 39-40.
98. See 16 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:12 (4th ed. 2000).
Section 49:12 states:
[C]ourts are hesitant to invalidate an insurance contract or clause on the ground of
public policy, and will not do so unless the public policy is clearly set forth in an
express legislative enactment or a previously articulated judicial declaration, and
the contract or clause at issue clearly runs afoul of the public policy.
Id. Compare Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251, 253 (Nev. 2006) ("[W]e may
void an unambiguous exclusion if it violates public policy."), and U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Term.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381, 390 (Tenn. 2009) ("If the terms of an insurance
policy do not comport with the statutory requirements, the statutory requirements supersede
the conflicting policy provisions and become part of the insurance policy itself."), with
Mendez v. Brites, 849 A.2d 329, 338 (R.I. 2004) ("We are bound, however, 'to respect the
express terms and conditions of an insurance contract that are not in violation of public
policy."' (quoting Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 554 (R.I. 1990))), and
Neff Towing Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 652 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Neb. 2002) ("[A]n
insurer may limit its liability and impose restrictions and conditions upon its obligations
under the contract if the restrictions and conditions are not inconsistent with public policy or
statute.").
99. Some states, however, such as California, have placed restrictions on insurers'
ability to place benefits in RAAs by requiring a lump sum payment to be the default method
of disbursement absent some express agreement in writing by the beneficiary to elect
another method. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10170(e) (West 2005).
100. 783 F. Supp. 2d 207, 211-12 (D. Mass. 2011).
101. Luitgaren v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Can., No. 1:09-CV-l1410, 2010 WL 4722269,
at *1 (D. Mass Nov. 18, 2010).
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ERISA plans), this Massachusetts court consciously extended the Mogel
view that as long as the insurer holds onto plan assets, the fiduciary duty
continues. Even though the defendant-insurer argued in Luitgaren that the
plaintiff had "received everything to which he was entitled under the plan
documents," the court described this as an "all's well that ends well
[that] ignores the purpose of ERISA's imposition of fiduciary
approach
10 3
duties.s
In contrast to Otte and Luitgaren, Lucey presented an opportunity to
think about RAAs without the benefit of ERISA fiduciary obligations."
Lucey concerned a class of beneficiaries of group life insurance policies
issued under the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Act ("SGLIA").10 5
Although the contracts for life insurance called for payment in a lump sum,
Prudential (the insurer) instead provided beneficiaries with a checkbook
and access to the funds as part of a retained asset account."1 Plaintiffs
alleged various state law claims including fraud, breach of contract, breach
of the covenant of implied faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.107
It appears that until 1999 the insurer in fact provided checks to beneficiaries
who elected a lump sum option (the other choice was payment in thirty-six
equal monthly installments. which does not appear to have been a popular
choice). 08 Beginning in 1999, beneficiaries who elected a lump sum
received their payment through an "Alliance Account," which was
described as interest-bearing and "similar to a checking account."'"9 The
gist of the plaintiffs' complaint was that Prudential's contracts with them
and with the Veterans Administration ("VA") required payment in a lump
sum for those who made that choice.' 10 The district court agreed, noting that
Mogel "unambiguously held that delivery of the checkbook did not
constitute a lump sum payment called for by the policies.""' .

102. Otte ex rel. Estate of Reynolds v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 275 F.R.D. 50, 55 (D.
Mass. 2011).
103. Luitgaren, 2010 WL 4722269, at *1.
104. Lucey, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (discussing fiduciary duty outside the context of
ERISA).
105. 38 U.S.C. § 1970 (2008). Of significance in Lucey was the portion that afforded
the service member to "elect settlement of insurance under this subchapter in either a lump
sum or in thirty-six equal monthly installments" and extended that same right to "the
beneficiary or beneficiaries" in the absence of a decision by the service member. See 38
U.S.C. § 1970(d) (2011); Lucey, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10.
106. Lucey, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
107. Id. at 209.
108. Id. at 210.

109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 212 (quotingMogel v. UNUMLife Ins. Co. ofAm., 547 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir.
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lucey remains the lone example of success by plaintiffs without resort
to ERISA fiduciary claims. In all other reported instances, non-ERISA
plaintiffs have failed in their attempts to argue breach of contract,'t 2
fraud,' 13 and breach of fiduciary duty. 14 The absence of ERISA claims in
Lucey, however, did not preclude a short discussion of the fiduciary
obligations an insurer owes to insureds-at least those who are
beneficiaries by virtue of the SGLIA." In a short and astonishing
paragraph, the Lucey opinion noted that:
Plaintiffs' allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duty arise not out of
Defendant's role as holder of the life insurance policy, but instead out of
Defendant's role as holder of the insurance proceeds between the time of
death of the insured who elected a lump-sum payment and the time at
which the beneficiary actually possessed the lump sum. [Plaintiffs argue
that b]ecause Defendant benefitsfrom the use of the money during this time
...it has a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs. Defendant argues, to the contrary,
that any duties that it owes Plaintiffs cease once it makes the insurance
proceeds availablevia the Alliance Account, because its sole duty under the
contract is to pay the proceeds in a lump sum. This assertion, of course,
rises and then falls on Defendant's underlying contention that the creation
of the Alliance Account is the equivalent of the mailing of a check for the
lump SUM.16
This language seems to suggest that an insurer may in fact owe a
fiduciary duty to its insureds where, as here, it holds onto property
belonging to them.
The typical non-ERISA plaintiff has not been able to replicate the
outcome in Lucey. In Rabin the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling in favor of MONY Life Insurance Company ("MONY") on all five
claims made by the plaintiff related to the use of an RAA, called a MONY
Market Account by insurer, as the method for paying benefits owed." 7
Plaintiff claimed breach of contract when MONY failed to pay proceeds by
check and failed to award a competitive interest rate on the proceeds kept in
the MONY Market Account." The claim that payment by check was
required by the language of the policy rested on an interpretation of the

112. See, e.g., Keife v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078 (D. Nev.
2011); Garcia v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., No. 08-5756, 2009 WL 5206016, at *11 (D.N.J.
Dec. 29,2009).
113. See, e.g., Rabin v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 387 F. App'x 36,40 (2d Cir. 2010).
114. See, e.g., Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 11-CV-0058-DRH, 2011 WL
5915148, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011) ("It is well settled in Illinois that a fiduciary
relationship does not exist between an insurer and insured.").
115. See Lucey, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Rabin, 387 Fed. App'x at 38.
118. Id.
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words "pay" and "payable" that contemplated disbursement by check, but
the court found that contention so tenuous that "no rational fact finder could
conclude that such an obligation pertains to the payment."" 9 Moreover, the
language of the policy explicitly provided for payment by any means other
than lump sum. 1' On the second breach of contract claim, the court stressed
the provision of a brochure plaintiff received indicating that the rate in the
MONY Market Account would be tied to the national average of bank
money market accounts as measured by the Bank Rate Monitor Index. 21
Without evidence that this index "failed to represent a competitive rate of
return,"1 22 the claim failed as a matter of law.
The fraud claim related to the rate to be paid on the MONY Market
Account also failed for an absence of any misrepresentations by MONYeither collateral to the contract or material to the plaintiff's decision to enter
into it.123 The plaintiffs deceptive acts and practices claim was also
defeated by the brochure provision because state law required that MONY's
acts be materially misleading and the brochure made the interest rate
accruing on the account clear. That the brochure indicated that an account
would be opened in the plaintiff's name did not necessarily require that the
funds underlying that account be segregated. 125 To the extent that MONY's
representation that the benefits were payable through State Street Bank and
Trust Company might lead a reasonable policyholder in the plaintiffs
circumstances to conclude that the funds were deposited in an account in
that bank covered by FDIC insurance, there was no demonstration of any
loss due to the funds lacking FDIC insurance.12 6 Under New York law,
unjust enrichment claims are not available when there is a valid and
enforceable insurance contract, as there was in this case. 27 Lastly, there
was no breach of fiduciary duty because none exists at common law except
when the insurer is defending claims against the insured, and there was no
evidence in this case that MONY was exercising its investment discretion
of the funds on the plaintiffs behalf.128 The breadth of claims raised and
rejected in Rabin paints a very dismal picture for the prospects of nonERISA plaintiffs.
Garcia v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America demonstrates
further difficulties outside the ERISA context for beneficiaries, even where

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 38-39.
Id.at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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the option to elect a single sum was provided andelected at the creation of
the policy. 129 In this case, Prudential sent a claim form to the beneficiaries
with six settlement options, among which was an Alliance Account marked
as the preferred method of payment by the insurer and heavily marketed to
the beneficiary as the option to select. 30 While the claim form also included
text encouraging the reader to contact Prudential if none of the options
listed were of interest, the form included language that set the Alliance
Account as the default method of payment. 3' Plaintiff left the fields empty
where an alternative method of payment could be selected and signed the
claim form.132 Again, claims of breach of the insurance contract, breach of
the policy contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment were
raised and dismissed.'33 The breach of contract claim failed because the
policy permitted the plaintiff to elect a receipt of benefits that was different
from that chosen by the decedent and the insurer's compliance with that
choice to modify the method of payment amounted to the opposite of
breach.134 As to the breach of contract claim, the court, like in Rabin, noted
that there is no duty to segregate account funds and that the Alliance
Account was in fact an interest-bearing account to which the beneficiary
had access at all times.13 5 The court found plaintiffs further claim that the
Alliance Account was a "no-cost" account and therefore that Prudential was
obligated to divulge any profits from the spread between the interest rate
paid to the beneficiary and that earned by investing the funds through the
general account to be an unreasonable interpretation of the "no cost"
term.'36 The court also found that Prudential's promise to pay a
"competitive" interest rate could not reasonably be construed as a promise
to award all investment proceeds obtained from investing funds in the
Alliance Account.137
Phillips v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America also involved a
complaint raised against a Prudential Alliance Account, and again the court
found that the breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims should fail.138
Unique to Phillips was the plaintiff's claim for a breach of an Illinois state

129. See Garcia v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 08-5756, 2009 WL 5206016, at
* I (D.N.J. Dec. 29,2009).
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *3, *14.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id. at *9.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *10.
138. See Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 11-CV-0058-DRH, 2011 WL
5915148, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011).
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statute.139 The statute in question was enacted to provide a remedy for
beneficiaries who encounter difficulties when an insurer withholds benefits,
and the Phillips court found it to be inapplicable given that Plaintiff had
"'complete access to the proceeds" in the Alliance Account."14 Thus, the
takeaway message from most non-ERISA cases is that the insurance policy
language and the nature of the RAA accounts carefully skirt the bounds of
both common law claims and statutory safeguards.

III. HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE
A review of Faber,Mogel, and the handful of cases that have followed
suggests that a few general principles are emerging for both ERISA and
non-ERISA plans. In the non-ERISA context, it is clear that as long as plan
documents contemplate creation of an RAA, an insurer is within its rights
to create the RAA without any lingering concerns about fiduciary breach.14 1
Rabin, Garcia, and Phillips42 support this conclusion. Indeed, the court
noted in Phillips that "a fiducia relationship does not generally exist
between and insurer and insured."'
As one might expect, the fiduciary duty issue is significant where the
insurance is provided through an ERISA plan.'" In that situation, with the
45
an insurer faces potential liability for
notable exception of Faber,1
fiduciary breach whether the RAA is an explicit contractual option or not.1"
Mogel and the cases that follow it suggest that even when a contract for life
insurance provides for payment by RAA, fiduciary liability may attach
because an insurer should not "conflate compliance with plan documents
with compliance with the statutory requirements of ERISA."' 47
A substantial amount of all life insurance in the United States is
provided through ERISA plans.'48 Given the trajectory of Mogel and

139. Id.at *4.
140. Id.
141. See supraPart III.
142. Rabin v. MOMY Life Ins. Co. 387 Fed. App'x 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2010); Phillips,
2011 WL 5915148, at *2-3; Garcia, 2009 WL 5206016, at *2-3.
143.

Philips, 2011 WL 5915148, at *5.

144. See Mogel v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.3d 23,26 (1st Cir. 2008).
145. See Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011).
146. See, e.g., Mogel, 547 F.3d at 27; Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 777 F.
Supp. 2d 869, 883 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
147. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 869, 888 (E.D. Pa.
2011).
148. "[N]early two-thirds of private industry workers were offered life insurance
benefits by their employers in March 2011; of these, 97 percent chose to enroll in this
benefit." Raisa M. Blanco, Life InsuranceBenefits: VariationsBased on Workers'Earnings
and Work Schedules, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTcs (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/print/cm2O120329ar01pl.htm.
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uncertainty over the viability of Faber beyond the Second Circuit, plan
fiduciaries need to consider whether and how to limit liability if they utilize
the profitable RAA vehicle for the distribution of benefits. The objections
to the RAAs in Mogel and Edmonson are striking in that they focus on the
benefits provided by the RAA device to the plan sponsor at the expense of
the beneficiary.14 9 The Mogel court rejected the reasoning of the insurer that
the funds were the beneficiary's as a charade because "[u]ntil a beneficiary
draws a check on the Security Account, the funds represented by that check
are retained by UNUM and UNUM had the use of the funds for its own
benefit."' 50 The court in Edmonson, without drawing conclusions,
acknowledged that:
If the plaintiff alleges that as of the day she received the benefits to
which she was entitled, those benefits were diminished by the fiduciary's
impropriety and not remedied at the time of disbursement, that is sufficient
for statutory standing as a beneficiary. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the value
of her benefits in the SecureLine Account was diminished because
Defendant improperly retained the "spread," or the difference between the
interest that Defendant earned on the benefits and the interest that Plaintiff
received.15
Given that the plaintiffs in each of these cases could have written a
check at any time for the full amount of the policy benefit,15 2 it does not
seem unfair to ask how, exactly, they were harmed by the RAA. And the
answers-that the interest earned on the undistributed proceeds rightly
belongs to the beneficiary and that the assets were at some risk when they
remained with the insurer - are precisely the kinds of issues that full
disclosure could properly address.
In the end, there are four serious critiques of RAAs grounded in the fact
that beneficiary consumers simply do not understand the following: (1)
There really are no individual "accounts;" (2) The assets in the RAA are not
insured by the FDIC 53 and are therefore much riskier than a regular bank

149. See Mogel, 547 F.3d at 26; Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp.
2d 869, 883 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
150. Mogel, 547 F.3d at 26.
151. Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
152. See id. at 875; Mogel, 574 F.3d at 26.

153. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act established the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to insure deposits in all banks and savings associations eligible under the
statute. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006). The FDIC will guarantee up to $250,000 per person
per each type of account at each insured bank or savings association. This means that some
types of accounts (e.g., joint accounts) can have up to $500,000 in coverage at $250,000 per
owner. Deposit InsuranceFAQ, FDic.Gov, https://www.fdic.gov/edie/fdicinfo.html#01 (last
visited Dec. 20, 2012). Most important of all is that when there is "liquidation of, or other
closing or winding up of the affairs of, any insured depository institution, payment of the
insured deposits in such institution shall be made by the Corporation as soon as possible
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account; (3) Only a portion of the interest earned on the RAA is shared with
the beneficiary (which means the insurer is making a profit on the assets it
retains); and (4) The disclosure provided to beneficiaries is often
incomplete and/or deceptive. Each of these concerns must be addressed by
ERISA fiduciaries, at least outside of the Second Circuit. And, although
each concern is serious, disclosures written in clear and straightforward
language-both in the original plan documents and in the documents that
accompany the creation of the RAA-must address each of these
objections.
A. There Are No "IndividualAccounts"
ERISA fiduciaries with any experience administering defined benefit
plans' 54 or other pooled arrangements will readily understand the
importance of conveying this concept to plan participants and beneficiaries;
and there are plenty of good examples to employ. No informed participant
in a health insurance plan or a defined benefit pension arrangement believes
that "his" dollars are segregated in a separate account. (In contrast
participants in increasingly common defined-contribution arrangementss15
do track their investments in personal accounts.) Meaningful disclosure
requires that insureds and their beneficiaries understand that RAA funds are

." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1).
154. Defined-benefit plans "consist of a general pool of assets rather than individual
dedicated accounts" to provide for a fixed benefit and, notably, "no account is kept for an
employee." 60A Am. JuR. 2D Pensions § 15 (2005); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2011)
("The term 'defined benefit plan' means a pension plan other than an individual account
plan."). In this way, the defined-benefit plan operates in a fashion analogous to the
disbursement of life insurance benefits under RAAs. Defined-contribution plans, however,
specify the level of employer contributions and place those contributions into individual
employee accounts. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(34) (2011) (defining "individual account plan"
or "defined contribution plan" as "a pension plan which provides for an individual account
for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account.").
155. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 403(b), 401(k) (2010). A 403(b) plan, "also known as a tax
sheltered annuity (TSA) plan, is a retirement plan for certain employees of public schools,
employees of certain tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers" where pre-tax
contributions are made, usually by the employer, out of the employee's paycheck and into an
account tied to the employee. Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., Tax-Sheltered
Annuity Plans (403(b) Plans), ms.oov, at 2-3 (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/publirspdflp57l.pdf; see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2010) (example of an increasingly common
defined-contribution arrangement). A 401(k) plan operates in the same fashion in that it
"allows employees to contribute a portion of their wages to individual accounts." 401(k)
Plans, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans4Ol(k)-Plans (last visited Dec. 20,
2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) (2010).
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not separated in a special bank account. Beneficiaries who are
uncomfortable with pooling their proceeds should have sufficient
information to permit them to withdraw all funds.
B. No FDICInsurance
A related problem that arises out of the use of an "account" and the
issuance of a book of checks is the impression created in beneficiaries that
their retained dollars are in a bank-like account with all of the attendant
protections. As we have seen, this is not so. Full and fair disclosure here
requires that beneficiaries be informed not only of the absence of FDIC
insurance, but also of the risk that the insurer could become insolvent and
the assets subject to the claims of general creditors.' 6
How real this risk is has been the object of some debate.'s The Internet
has made it possible for insureds to readily ascertain information about the

156. When an insurer has become insolvent, most statutory schemes create priorities for
different claims against the insurer's assets. 1 COUCH ON INS. § 6:8 (2011). Typically claims
have the following priority: (1) administrative costs of liquidation; (2) wages by insurer's
former employees; (3) taxes and debts owed to the government that are secured by liens
before the delinquency proceeding; (4) policyholders, beneficiaries and insureds, third-party
and guarantee association claims; (5) all other claims. Id. Each state places their own
variations on these general rules. See, e.g., Gen. Reinsurance Corp. v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co.
of Fla., 996 A.2d 26, 34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) ("When the final distribution of the estate
assets is made, all policyholder claimants, including guaranty associations, will receive the
same percentage reimbursement on their claims."); State ex rel. Grimes v. Okla. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 796 P.2d 352, 353 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990) ("Clearly, the Legislature
intended policyholders, general creditors or not, to have priority over all other claims except
administration expenses and certain employees."). Some states will also vary the priority of
claims. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1033 (West 2000); N.Y. INs. LAW § 7434 (McKinney
2005); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 443.301 (West 2011). Where the condition of the insurer was
so poor, as Executive Life Insurance Corporation was in 1991, policyholders were left with
very little. Lisa Girion, 'LittlePeople Floundering'FromExecutive Life Losses, L.A. TIMES,

Apr. 28, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/28/businessfi-execlife28 ("More than 10
years after the failure of California's Executive Life Insurance Co., many of its
policyholders, some of them elderly and disabled, are struggling to get by on monthly
annuity payments that are 30% to 50% less than what they had been promised.") It took
years for many of these policyholders to win civil damages to compensate for the shortfall.
Executive Life Policyholders to Finally Get Payments from Class Action Case, INSURE.COM,

http://www.insure.com/articlestlawsuitlibrary/executive-life.html (last updated Dec. 21,
2000); see also Gersenson v. Pa. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 729 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999).
157. Compare David S. Hilzenrath, Va. Insurer's Decline Came With Scant Warning:
Policyholders at Risk After Firm Seized, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2009,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/03/AR2009030303833
.html ("[Tihe situation at Shenandoah illustrates what can happen to consumers as the global
financial crisis eats away at the assets insurance companies hold to absorb losses and pay
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financial health of their insurers; 58 however, it is hard to imagine bereaved
beneficiaries taking steps to gather this information at the time the RAA is
formed and they receive their checkbook in the mail. And, fortunately, they
do not have to. In much the way that securities dealers routinely disclose
that proffered investments are not FDIC insured,s 9 RAA beneficiaries
could and should receive the same information.
C. Interest Income

Fiduciaries need, at a minimum, to disclose the rate of interest to be
paid on the assets in the RAA, along with the market rate for comparable
investments. Information provided in this context should be sufficient to
allow a beneficiary to decide whether to leave the money in the RAA or to
write a check for the full amount of the policy proceeds. The claim in
Edmonson that the fiduciary violated the exclusive benefit rule is easiest to
understand in this context. In a situation where the insurance company
invests the RAA dollars and splits the return with the beneficiary (which
seems to be the most common current arrangement), there is clearly a
benefit that accrues to the insurer when the dollars remain in the RAA. The
question, however, is not whether there is an incidental benefit, which
ERSIA permits,"o but whether the benefit is so substantial as to constitute a

claims."), and Diane Levick, As Life and Health Insurers Struggle, Consumers Face
Toughest of Choices: Cash out? Stay in?, HARTFORD CouRANT, Apr. 11, 2009, availableat

2009 WLNR 6815533 ("[Guaranty] funds 'may create the illusion of safety where it does
not exist."' (quoting J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins. for the Consumer Fed'n of Am.)), with
Steve Wartenberg, Insurance Safety Net Backed By Companies, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar.
29, 2009, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2009/03/29/INSURINGTHE
_INSURERS.ARTART_03-29-09_DlF5DC6KP.html ("'[L]ife insurers in particular are
feeling stress .. . [b]ut most are just fine."' (quoting Donald Light, a senior insurance analyst
at Celent, a Boston-based financial-consulting firm)).
158. See, e.g., A.M. BEST Co., http://www.ambest.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012);
MOODY's, http://www.moodys.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012); STANDARD & POOR'S,

http://www.standardandpoors.com/home/en/us (last visited Dec. 20, 2012); Products and
Services,

WEISs

RATINGS,

http://www.weissratings.com/products/life-and-annuity-

insurers.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
159. All non-FDIC insured institutions must post "clearly and conspicuously in all
advertising . . . at each station or window where deposits are normally received, [at] its
principal place of business and all its branches where it accepts deposits or opens accounts
... and on its main Internet page, a notice that the institution is not federally insured." 12
U.S.C. § 1831t(b)(2)(A) (2011).
160. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996) (holding no breach of fiduciary
duty under the exclusive-benefit requirement where employer amended retirement plan to
create an option for higher benefits in exchange for a waiver of legal claims arising out of
the course of employment by the beneficiary). Justice Thomas's majority opinion made clear
that:
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breach of fiduciary duty. Once again, the quality of the disclosure would
seem to matter tremendously here. As long as a beneficiary understands that
he is entitled to only a portion of the return on his assets should he elect to
leave them with the insurer, it is hard to see how this could be viewed as
anything other than an incidental benefit to the fiduciary, given that the
owner of the RAA can withdraw all dollars at any time.
D. Incomplete or Deceptive Disclosure
At least since the Supreme Court's decision in Varity v. Howe,' 6 1 one
hallmark of actionable fiduciary breach has been the conscious and
deliberate dissemination of inaccurate information for the purpose of
misleading participants and beneficiaries. "To participate knowingly and
significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the
employer money at the beneficiaries' expense is not to act solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries."l 62 And, rightly so. Although
each disclosure must be evaluated on its own merits, language that appears
designed to encourage a beneficiary to make a decision that is, objectively,
not in his best interests will always be suspect.163 As the Third Circuit has

[Ilncidental . . . benefits that a plan sponsor may receive from the operation of a
pension plan are attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred
compensation, settling or avoiding strikes, providing increased compensation
without increasing wages, increasing employee turnover, and reducing the
likelihood of lawsuits by encouraging employees who would otherwise have been
laid off to depart voluntarily.
Id. at 893-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Varsity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996). Varity Corporation attempted to
avoid fulfilling the medical and non-pension benefits of its subsidiary by executing a
corporate bait-and-switch dubbed "Project Sunshine." Id. at 493. Varity created a new
subsidiary into which it transferred all of its money-losing divisions in the hope that the new
developed entity would fail-but in a contained fashion-to protect the more profitable
divisions from being on the hook for those debts. Id. Varity then held a special meeting to
entice the Massey-Ferguson employees to voluntarily switch employers over to the newly
created Massey Combines, and in so doing release Massey-Ferguson from its obligations. Id.
The crux of this meeting was an extensive presentation in which Varity officials represented
that employee benefits would not be jeopardized by the change in employment despite their
knowledge that "Massey Combines was insolvent from the day of its creation." Id. at 494.
162. Id. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1164 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
employer may have breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA because of its
misrepresentations). The Sixth Circuit, in Berlin, became the first circuit to find that material
misrepresentations concerning the availability of enhanced benefits in the future could form
the basis for fiduciary liability. See id.; see also Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d
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noted, an ERISA fiduciary must do more than simply avoid outright
dishonesty.'" In Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health &

Welfare Fund, the plaintiff's husband was a member of the teamsters,
whose medical, disability, and life insurance plan ("The Fund") had lapsed
prior to his death due to collective bargaining issues.'65 The employer broke
off negotiations to initiate a new benefits plan and the employees, including
plaintiffs husband, called a strike.166 Both the natural lapse and the strike
were disruptions in coverage under The Fund and were thus "qualifying
events" under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
("COBRA") amendments to ERISA,167 which would have allowed the
decedent to maintain the same coverage offered by The Fund or the new
employer plan respectively.'6 8 Plaintiffs husband died after the election
period for The Fund's COBRA had lapsed and during the election period
for the new employer plan, although no payment for coverage was
submitted. 6 9
Bixler's complaint alleged that a series of conversations with personnel
from The Fund and her husband's employer left her with the errant belief
that coverage under either plan could not be continued. 70 And while the
court found that there was no breach as a result of the conversation with
The Fund, there was still a sufficient concern: Although the employer
"responded with a specific and accurate answer" to Bixler's question, there
was enough evidence in the record to indicate that the employer knew
enough about the Bixlers' circumstances and that the employer's fiduciary
obligation was to advise as to available benefits.17 ' The Third Circuit based
this conclusion on its recognition that the role of a fiduciary is not a passive
one:
This duty to inform is a constant thread in the relationship between
beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only a negative duty not to
misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee

117, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A fiduciary] may not actively misinform its plan beneficiaries
about the availability of future retirement benefits to induce them to retire earlier than they
otherwise would, regardless of whether or not it is seriously considering future plan
changes"); Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963, 967-68 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that a claim
for failure to diversify ESOP assets is stated where fiduciaries were allegedly engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to impair financial condition of ESOP sponsor).
164. See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir.
1993).

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1295.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2011).
BixIer, 12 F.3d at 1295.
Id. at 1295-96.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
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knows that silence might be harmful. In addition, the duty
recognizes the disparity of training and knowledge that potentially
exists between a lay beneficiary and a trained fiduciary. Thus,
while the beneficiary may, at times, bear a burden of informing the
fiduciary of her material circumstance, the fiduciary's obligations
failed to comprehend or ask
will not be excused merely because 1she
about a technical aspect of the plan. 72
Thus, information and advice that is proffered must in fact encourage
an advantageous result for the beneficiary.
Some have suggested banning RAAs altogether on the basis that they
never represent an attractive option for a beneficiary17 3 and can be
understood only as a profit-making opportunity for insurers who, with their
superior knowledge and investment expertise, are simply taking advantage
of unsophisticated insureds and their beneficiaries. Professor Stempel and
others have argued that a beneficiary is better off taking a lump sum
payment.174 Peter Kochenburger, executive director of the University of
Connecticut School of Law's Insurance Law Center, wants beneficiaries to
be more assertive and not "simply accept the option the insurance company
provides." 175
In evaluating this claim, it is important to remember that every RAA
arrangement allows for the immediate withdrawal of all funds by simply
writing one check for the full policy proceeds. No beneficiary is ever forced
to leave assets in a risky, non-FDIC insured account that earns interest for
the insurer exclusively. So, the question is not whether a beneficiary can
avoid an RAA-they can. The question is, should the law prohibit an
arrangement that at least some beneficiaries appear to want? There are
myriad consumer arrangements that share the least attractive features of the
RAA-risk and a suboptimal investment option. Credit cards,'7 6 automobile

172. Id. at 1300.
173. Jeffrey Stempel, Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the
University of Nevada, has intimated as much by describing the industry practice as
"institutionalized bad faith . . . [designed] to defraud by inducing the policyholder's

beneficiary to let the life insurance company retain assets they're not entitled to." Evans,
supranote 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Eleanor Laise, A Dubious Deal for a Death Benefit, KIPLINGER (May 2012),
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/krr-a-dubious-deal-for-a-death-benefit.html.
Professor Stempel has taken his colleague's advice further by advocating that "the better
thing is just to get control of the money as soon as you can." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
175. Id.
176. The variable but inevitably high interest rates on unpaid principal create a financial
trap for persons who find themselves unable to pay more than the minimum monthly
payment. Missing just a few payments can damage an individual's credit score and undercut
their ability to acquire housing, save for retirement, or get a job. See The Dangersof Credit
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loans, 1" payday loans,'7 8 and other consumer products' 79 directed at those
with poor or non-existent credit come to mind. And, while it is easy to see
the ways in which these products are less than ideal, some consumers
continue to demand them. Substituting the judgment of regulators for
beneficiaries by banning RAAs is an approach that would have the direct
effect of reducing consumer choice. It is hard to see why RAAs represent a
more serious threat to the consumer public than, say, payday loans.'so And,
Card Debt, Sopi MC, http://www.sopimc.com/the-dangers-of-credit-card-debt.php (last
visited Dec. 20, 2012).
177. Small initial fees blind the debtor to the exorbitant rates of interest charged on the
unpaid principal-whether using an existing vehicle as collateral or seeking to purchase one
with poor credit. See, e.g., Avoid the Dangers of Car Title Loans, FINANCIALWEB,
http://www.finweb.com/loans/avoid-the-dangers-of-car-title-loans.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2012); Subprime Auto Loans: 3 Dangers, FINANCIALWEB, http://www.finweb.com/loans/
subprime-auto-loans-3-dangers.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
178. Many persons are forced to rely on these short-term high interest rate loans in
order to meet basic expenses due to low income, creating a perpetuating debt cycle. Jennifer
Waters, Payday Loans Could Spur Costly Debt Cycle, MARKETWATCH (July 30, 2012),
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-07-30/finance/32924985 l_payday-loans-communityfinancial-services-association-advance-america.
179. Subprime mortgages, private student loans, tax-refund anticipation loans, checkcashing stores, and pawnshop loans ran among some of the most predatory. What is
Predatory Lending?, LSUAGCENTER.CoM, http://www.1suagcenter.com/en/familyhome/
home/design construction/Getting+Started/Preparing+Financially/What+is+Predatory+Lend
ing.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). Elizabeth Warren, Former Special Advisor to the
Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in advocating for
the now-functioning Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, aptly described these financial
products as attempts by lenders to "bury risks and to move the true costs to the back end of
the transaction with ballooning interest rates or payment obligations, unexpected fees, or
hard-to-avoid penalties." Oversight of The Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,

112th Cong. 52 (2011) (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Secretary of
the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/l 12-18.pdf. Some have even advocated for
the agency to investigate fees associated with pre-paid credit cards. See Mary Beth Quirk,
Consumers Union Urges CFPB To Regulate Prepaid Credit Cards More Closely, THE
CONSUMERIST (May 23, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/05/consumers-union-urges-

cfpb-to-regulate-prepaid-credit-cards-more-closely.html.
180. "Typical loans are for over $300, due on the borrower's next payday, and cost $15
to $30 per $100 loaned or 390 to 780 percent annual percentage rate." Jean Ann Fox &
Patrick Woodall, Cashed Out: Consumers Pay Steep Premium to "Bank" at Check Cashing
(Nov.
2006),
OF
AMERICA,
at
2
Outlets,
CONSUMER
FEDERATION

These
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_CheckCashingStudyl 11506.pdf.
rates allow the industry to take "$3.1 billion in wealth from low-income, working poor who
are literally trying to pay bills from paycheck to paycheck." Tanya Somanader, Report: How
PaydayLenders Make Billions By FleecingAmericans In Poverty, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Jan

19, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/01/19/407365/report-how-
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all of the objections to RAAs can be addressed by insisting on high quality
disclosure from insurers. If, in spite of the newly disclosed disadvantages,
consumers still wish to leave insurance proceeds with their insurer, surely
they should be free to do so.
For the ERISA fiduciary, high quality disclosure would provide
protection against a claim of fiduciary breach. In the non-ERISA state
contract context, the disclosure would likewise insulate the insurer from
state claims of fraud and misrepresentation. If, with ample disclosure, it
turns out that beneficiaries refuse to leave dollars in an RAA, then the
disclosure (which respects the judgment and autonomy of the beneficiary)
has done its job. On the other hand, if beneficiaries-fully informed of the
risks and drawbacks-continue to vote with their money and leave it in
RAAs, the law should have nothing to say. Consumers make foolish
decisions all the time-the purchase of lottery tickets,181 for example, is a
persistent example of objectively irrational behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION

RAAs are a life insurance innovation that is likely of small value to
most beneficiaries. In many cases, it will make the most financial sense for
a beneficiary to write a check to himself for the entire policy proceeds and
deposit those funds into an insured bank account. Some beneficiaries,
however, may find the RAA device helpful. It is impossible to anticipate
the myriad circumstances that beneficiaries may face at the time of an
insured's death. As long as insurers provide full and clear disclosure (which
ERISA fiduciary standards demand), consumers should remain free to
choose an RAA as one of several options.

payday-lenders-make-billions-by-fleecing-americans-in-poverty/?mobile=nc.
181. Because of the long odds of winning (the Mega Millions has one-in-176 million
odds), combined with other post winning costs such as taxes, sharing with others, and
penalties associated with an upfront payout, "the value of a $1 ticket is only 63.2cents (or a
bit more or less depending on your state." Brad Plumer, Mega Millions frenzy: Can you ever
beat the lottery's long odds?, EzRA KLEIN'S WONKBLOG (Mar. 30, 2012, 10:03 AM)
(quoting Jeremy Elson, a computer scientist) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/mege-millions-frenzy-can-you-everDespite this
fact,
beat-the-lotterys-long-odds/2012/03/30/gIQAbRmCIS-blog.html.
"[p]laying the lottery is practically a religion among poor people in the United States."
Palash R. Ghosh, Mega Millions Lottery: A Curse And Plague On The Poor, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2012, 5:49 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles

/321601/20120329/lottery-mega-millions-state-new-york-poverty.htm. Various studies by
consumer organizations have found that people making $13,000 or less have spent anywhere
from 5% to 9% of their wages on lotteries, "making this 'harmless' game a 'deeply
regressive tax."' Id.

